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COMMENT
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: A MODERN




The Supreme Court first applied the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity in 1846.' The origin of sovereign immunity as applied in suits
against the federal government is unclear,2 but the doctrine is based on
the premise that the United States cannot be sued without its consent.
Courts view the federal government's immunity from suit as a jurisdic-
tional defect of a plaintiff's suit: the plaintiff can maintain an action
against the government only if Congress waives immunity. A federal
officer therefore cannot confer jurisdiction by waiving sovereign immu-
nity.3
Congress has abolished sovereign immunity in many instances by
specifically providing for statutory review of agency action.4 In the ab-
sence of specific authorization, judicial review of agency action must be
based on a general jurisdiction statute.5 A plaintiff forced to seek this
"nonstatutory review, '6 however, faces the possibility that the jurisdic-
tional defect of sovereign immunity will bar his action.
Congress most recently waived sovereign immunity in 1976 by
1. United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286 (1846).
2. Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity,
Indispensable Parties Mandamus, 75 HARv. L. REV. 1479, 1484 (1962). See notes 12-23 infra and
accompanying text.
3. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Needfor Statutory
Reform of Sovereign Immunigy, Subject Matler Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L.
Rav. 387, 392 (1970).
4. Examples of the elimination of sovereign immunity are the Tucker Act of 1875,28 U.S.C.
1346, 1491 (1976) (suits based on government contracts); Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976); Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(0, 1402(d), 2409a (1976). See notes
38-45 infra and accompanying text.
5. WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3568 at 463-4 (1970).
6. Nonstatutory review is a misnomer because all judicial review in federal courts must be
based on statutes. The distinction between statutory and nonstatutory review is whether proceed-
ings are specifically authorized by statute in relation to agency action or whether they are avail-
able as general remedies under a general jurisdiction statute. Fuchs, Judicial Control of
Administrative Agencies in Indiana, 28 IND. L.J. 1, 11-13 (1952).
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amending section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act 7 to "remove
the defense of sovereign immunity as a bar to judicial review of Fed-
eral administrative action otherwise subject to judicial review." 8 The
1976 amendments were designed to eliminate the confusion in prior
case law concerning nonstatutory review of administrative actions by
federal courts.9 Nevertheless, the extent to which the 1976 amend-
ments have abolished sovereign immunity in nonstatutory review ac-
tions remains a subject of conflict among the federal courts of appeals.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has interpreted the
amendments very narrowly, 10 adding to, rather than clarifying, the
confusion that existed before 1976. The Courts of Appeals for the
Third and Ninth Circuits, on the other hand, have interpreted the
amendments broadly" and have succeeded in outlining the extent to
which the amendments abolish sovereign immunity. The lower courts
in these circuits have meaningful guidelines for deciding whether sov-
ereign immunity will bar a claim in nonstatutory review actions.
This comment examines the historical explanations for the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity as applied in nonstatutory review actions
and the doctrine's rational purposes in modem society. After discuss-
ing the modem rationale for sovereign immunity, the comment looks to
the cases decided since the 1976 amendments to the Administrative
Procedure Act to discover if the decisions comport with the doctrine's
modem rationale. This comment concludes by suggesting several ways
for the courts and Congress to ensure that the doctrine will be ration-
ally and properly applied in the future.
I. WHY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY?
A. Historical Explanations.
Discussing the origin of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in
United States v. Lee,' 2 Justice Miller observed that despite the repeated
application of the doctrine, the "principle has never been discussed or
the reasons for it given, but it has always been treated as established
7. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976). For the full text of the amended sections see note 91 infra.
8. H.R. REP. No. 94-1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 6121.
9. See notes 50-84 infra and accompanying text.
10. Estate of Watson v. Blumenthal, 586 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1978). See notes 112-29 infra and
accompanying text.
11. Legal Aid Soc'y v. Brennan, 608 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 3010
(1980); Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979); Hill v.
United States, 571 F.2d 1098 (9th Cir. 1978). See notes 132-45 infra and accompanying text.
12. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
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doctrine."' 13 Sovereign immunity existed as part of English common
law and may have been carried over to colonial America in its English
form. Sovereign immunity in its present American form, however,
does not follow the English model.14 The underlying rationale of Eng-
lish sovereign immunity-that the King as sovereign can do no
wrong 5-was rejected by the abolition of the monarchy in this coun-
try.' 6
In early cases the government asserted a number of practical rea-
sons for the sovereign immunity doctrine. In United States v. Lee17 the
government argued that the United States would be degraded if it were
made a party-defendant to a lawsuit. The Court noted, however, that
the government constantly appears in court as plaintiff or prosecutor,
and would not be degraded by its additional appearances as defend-
ant."' The Court likewise rejected the government's argument that "it
would be inconsistent with the very idea of supreme executive power,
and would endanger the performance of the public duties of the sover-
eign, to subject him to repeated suits . . . at the will of any citizen
.... ",' The Court stated: "As no person in this government exercises
supreme executive power, or performs the public duties of a sovereign,
it is difficult to see on what solid foundation of principle the exemption
from liability to suit rests." 20 The notion of sovereign immunity based
on supreme executive power is wholly inconsistent with the American
form of government. The government's argument in Lee was essen-
13. Id. at 207.
14. The conclusion that American sovereign immunity is not based on the English doctrine is
supported by the absence of any mention of sovereign immunity in the Constitution.
15. Byse, supra note 2, at 1484.
16. Sovereign immunity in England never barred relief completely. Rather, in seventeenth-
century England, subjects of the King could petition for a suit against the Crown. In any given
case a plaintiff might thus be permitted to proceed against the sovereign. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 197 (1965).
The eleventh amendment to the Constitution provides no sovereign immunity to the United
States. The amendment provides: "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any fore:ign state." Only the states enjoy
immunity from suits in federal courts under the eleventh amendment. Byse, supra note 2, at 1484
n.13. Some courts have assumed, however, that the eleventh amendment extends to the states the
same immunity already possessed by the federal government. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264 (1821). See also Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386 (1850); United States v.
McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286 (1846); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
738 (1824). This is a different matter than arguing that the amendment itself renders the federal
government immune from suit.
17. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
18. Id. at 206.
19. Id. (quoting Briggs v. Light Boats, 93 Mass. (I1 Allen) 157 (1865)).
20. 106 U.S. at 206.
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tially a reformulation of the notion that the king can do no wrong-a
notion inappropriate in a country that has no king.
The Supreme Court has stated, as a reason for the doctrine, that
the government should not be "stopped in its tracks by any plaintiff
who presents a disputed question .... "-21 This argument, however,
ignores the realities of judicial review. As Kenneth Culp Davis noted:
The plain, clear, visible reality is, as no one knows better than
Supreme Court Justices, that courts including the Supreme Court are
constantly interfering with the public administration and constantly
stopping the government in its tracks. . . . Many of the great consti-
tutional decisions throughout our history have stopped the govern-
ment in its tracks and have interfered in public administration.
22
Professor Davis, in another article, concludes that the only historical
support for the sovereign immunity doctrine is "provided by that four-
horse team so often encountered-historical accident, habit, and natu-
ral tendency to favor the familiar, and inertia.
' 23
B. The Modern Rationale.
One commentator has noted that "[n]o scholar, so far as can be
ascertained, has had a good word for sovereign immunity for many
years." 24 The question thus arises whether there is any sound rationale
for the doctrine's continued vitality in the federal courts. There are two
plausible arguments for some form of sovereign immunity. The two
provide basic tests for whether a federal court should hear a nonstatu-
tory review action. The first argument is that sovereign immunity "re-
flects the Constitution's allocation of power among the three branches
of government. ' 25 According to this separation-of-powers rationale, a
court should ask whether granting the relief the plaintiff seeks would
encroach upon powers constitutionally committed to another branch of
government, most notably the executive branch.26 The second argu-
ment that may rationally explain the vitality of the sovereign immunity
doctrine is that "official actions of the Government must be protected
from undue judicial interference." 27 According to this theory, the ap-
plication of the doctrine should be based upon a consideration of
"whether the benefits of judicial review of administrative action are
21. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949).
22. K. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 27.00-7, at 915 (1970 Supp.).
23. Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 AD. L. REV. 383, 384 (1970).
24. Cramton, supra note 3, at 419.
25. Abernathy, Sovereign Immunity in a Constitutional Government: The Federal Employment
Discrimination Cases, 10 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 322, 323 (1975).
26. Id. 368.
27. Cramton, supra note 3, at 397.
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outweighed by the possible interference with governmental programs
that may result from the grant of relief."28
The following situation, based on the facts of Jarecki v. United
States,29 illustrates the application of both the separation-of-powers
test and the undue-judicial-interference test. Three federal uniformed
civilian guards are denied appointment to the Federal Protective Serv-
ice, a special guard force created by the General Services Administra-
tion to protect federal buildings from terrorist attack. Members of the
Federal Protective Service receive a higher GS classification than other
uniformed guards. The three persons pass the appropriate civil service
examination, but fail the required physical examination. They bring
suit against the General Services Administration and the Civil Service
Commission contesting the legality of the Federal Protective Service
and alleging that the agency abused its discretion in refusing to reclas-
sify them.
On these facts, a federal district court would dismiss the suit for
lack of jurisdiction because of sovereign immunity. The separation-of-
powers rationale would suggest that classification of jobs in the Federal
Protective Service is not a decision which courts are capable of making;
the decision should be left to the executive branch. Congress has en-
trusted the General Services Administration and the Civil Service
Commission, both executive agencies, with broad discretion in these
matters.30
Application of the undue-judicial-interference test to the Jarecki
facts would result in the same outcome. In fact, the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit used this type of argument as an alternative
ground for its actual decision in Jarecki. The court stated, "We cannot
grant relief that would place 'an intolerable burden on governmental
functions, outweighing any consideration of private harm.' ",31 The
court in Jarecki also stated, however, that the same result would hold
even without a consideration of sovereign immunity.3 2
Although both the separation-of-powers test and the undue-judi-
cial-interference test provide justification for the sovereign immunity
doctrine, the results these tests produce can often be achieved through
resort to other threshold standards of jurisdiction, such as standing or
28. Id. 415. See also Byse, supra note 2, at 1490; Davis, supra note 23, at 384.
29. 590 F.2d 670 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 829 (1979). This case was decided after
Congress enacted the 1976 amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act, Act of Oct. 21, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 1, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-703 (1976)).
30. See 5 U.S.C. § 5101 (1976); 590 F.2d at 677.
31. 590 F.2d at 675 (quoting Schlafly v. Volpe, 495 F.2d 273, 280 (7th Cir. 1974)).
32. 590 F.2d at 675. The court inJarecki reached the same conclusion on the grounds of lack
of standing, id., and failure to exhaust administrative remedies, id. at 679.
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failure to exhaust administrative remedies,33 without resort to such a
complex, ill-understood doctrine as sovereign immunity. For this rea-
son, among others, Congress has abolished many of the remnants of
sovereign immunity in nonstatutory review actions.3 4 Congress has
not, however, completely abolished sovereign immunity. Whenever
the doctrine is still applicable, the courts should use the undue-judicial-
interference test and the separation-of-powers test. Both tests are based
on identifiable and constitutionally supportable rationales. 35 They re-
quire courts to examine thoroughly the exact nature of the suit and the
government interest involved. Deeper examination of these elements
by the courts will eliminate much of the injustice imposed through
blind application of sovereign immunity.36
II. APPLICATION OF THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOCTRINE IN
NONSTATUTORY REVIEW CASES BEFORE 1976: A MAZE OF
IRRATIONALITY
A. The General Erosion of Sovereign Immunity.
Originally, sovereign immunity absolutely barred any suit against
the federal government. The courts preceded Congress in recognizing
the need, in certain circumstances, to refuse to apply sovereign immu-
nity. Although courts recognized the doctrine and applied it in most
instances, they also sought to alleviate some of its harshness and injus-
tice. They therefore created the legal fiction of an ultra vires action
against public officials.37 In this type of action the plaintiff alleged that
the officer's conduct violated his rights and that the officer acted with-
33. The general rule is that "[n]o one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened
injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted." Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-
building Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938). The rule is not without exceptions, however, because
courts will not require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies if exhaustion will cause irrep-
arable injury or the agency has no obvious jurisdiction. See K. DAvis, supra note 22, § 20.01
(1958 & 1976 Supp.). In Jarecki v. United States, 590 F.2d 670 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
829 (1979), the court found that none of the plaintiffs had "exhausted the extensive remedies
provided by the Classification Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5512; 5 C.F.R. §§ 511.601 et seq ... " 590 F.2d at
679.
The requirements for standing to bring suit were set forth in two Supreme Court cases, Asso-
ciation of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) and Barlow v. Col-
lins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). First, there must be injury in fact. Second, the interest the plaintiffseeks
to protect must be "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute
or constitutional guarantee in question." Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v.
Camp, 397 U.S. at 153. See generally K. DAvis, supra note 22, § 22.04 (1958 & 1970 Supp.).
34. See notes 91-100 infra and accompanying text. See also note 5 supra.
35. See notes 25-28 supra and accompanying text. The tests are based on similar considera-
tions and should therefore yield similar results.
36. See notes 59-70 infra and accompanying text.
37. Byse, supra note 2, at 1485.
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out legal authorization. If the court found that the officer did act
outside his authority, the court would permit the plaintiff's suit and
treat it as an action against a private individual. 38 These lawsuits were
either for damages or for equitable relief.
39
In many situations this nonstatutory suit was inadequate to meet
the needs of citizens demanding redress of their grievances. Congress
reacted by enacting a variety of statutes authorizing suits against the
government as the need arose. The first such law was the Court of
Claims Act of 1855.40 It created the Court of Claims and empowered
that court to award damages against the United States in actions aris-
ing out of government contracts. Twenty-two years later, Congress ex-
panded the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and granted concurrent
jurisdiction to United States District Courts in certain cases.41 Con-
gress later waived government immunity for many torts committed by
government officials, by enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act.42 In
addition, the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962,43 though it did not
eliminate any type of sovereign immunity, did facilitate the bringing of
nonstatutory review actions. The Act permitted the federal district
courts to issue injunctive or declaratory decrees against federal officers
to accomplish the same results that a writ of mandamus would have
achieved.44
Since 1972 Congress has also permitted private citizens to main-
tain quiet title actions against the government.45 Before 1972 sovereign
immunity prohibited landowners from bringing such suits, often creat-
38. R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 46-47
(1955).
39. Byse, supra note 2, at 1481.
40. Ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (1855).
41. Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 507, 1346, 1402,
1491, 1496-1497, 1501, 1503, 2071-2072, 2411, 2501, 2512 (1976)). The Tucker Act currently pro-
vides for concurrent jurisdiction in the Court of Claims and the United States District Court in all
cases arising out of government contracts in which the amount sought in damages is less than
$10,000. The Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over contract cases worth more than
$10,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (1976).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
43. Id. § 1361.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any
agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." See Kentucky exrel. Hancock v. Ruckel-
shaus, 497 F.2d 1172 (6th Cir. 1974), aj'd on other grounds sub. nom Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S.
167 (1976); Switzerland Co. v. Udall, 337 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965).
Prior to the addition of section 1361, federal district courts, except those in the District of
Columbia, could not issue original writs of mandamus. See generally Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361
of the Mandamus and Venue Act o(1962 and "Nonstatutory"Judicial Review of FederalAdministra-
dye Action, 81 HARV. L. REv. 308 (1967).
45. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(0, 1402(d), 2409(a) (1976).
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ing obvious injustices. In the case of Malone v. Bowdoin,46 for example,
a landowner filed a common law ejectment action against a Forest
Service officer of the Department of Agriculture. The plaintiff claimed
he was the rightful owner of the property and the defendant-officer
claimed that the United States held the property under a valid deed.
The Supreme Court upheld a dismissal of the suit based on sovereignimmunity;47 none of the courts hearing the case ever decided the legal
status of the title to the property. To rectify this type of injustice, Con-
gress enacted legislation permitting private citizens to bring quiet title
suits against the government.48
B. Nonstatutory Review Actions: From Lee to Larson.
While Congress was gradually abolishing sovereign immunity in
the areas of contracts, torts, and quiet title actions, the doctrine contin-
ued to block a great number of suits against the federal government. In
those cases a plaintiff's only resort was to bring an action against a
government officer under the legal fiction of ultra vires.49 This section
will examine the Supreme Court's decisions involving sovereign immu-
nity in nonstatutory review actions. Those decisions created a complex
and confusing body of case law that led Congress to amend the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act in 1976.
The earliest leading case formulating a test for sovereign immunity
was United States v. Lee.50 In that case the plaintiff brought suit to
recover eleven acres of land that the government held under a tax
deed.51 If the tax sale was valid, Lee had no claim to the property, but
if the sale was invalid, title would be quieted in Lee. The jury trying
the case found for the plaintiff.52 On appeal, the government claimed
that the federal court could not render judgment in favor of Lee be-
cause the judgment would act upon the sovereign without the sover-
46. 369 U.S. 643 (1962).
47. Id. at 648.
48. See note 45 supra. See also H.R. REP. No. 94-1656, supra note 8, at 8, reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6128.
49. See notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
50. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
51. The property in question was Arlington National Cemetery. Prior to the Civil War the
land was used as the home of Robert E. Lee and his family. During the war, the government
imposed taxes on the property but when a representative of General Lee tendered the taxes, the
revenue agents refused to accept the tender. The agents interpreted the tax statute in question as
requiring the actual person against whom the taxes were levied to tender payment. The land was
then put up for a tax sale and purchased by the United States government. The property was used
as a military base and a cemetery for Union soldiers. Id. at 197-98.




Justice Miller, writing for the Supreme Court, noted that the gov-
ernment's sole contention was that anyone who asserted executive au-
thority was absolutely immune from judicial review.5 4 The Court held
that the judiciary could not maintain this type of deference to the exec-
utive branch. The idea was "opposed to all principles upon which the
rights of citizens, when brought in collision with acts of government,
must be determined."55 Justice Miller's test was, rather, whether the
issues presented were clearly capable of being decided by the judici-
ary.56 If the issues were not of the type the judiciary usually decided,
the court would dismiss the suit. In a sense, Justice Miller applied a
separation-of-powers test.57
The reasoning and result of the Lee case is sound under both mod-
em rationales for sovereign immunity.58 The judiciary was capable of
deciding the issues in the case and the decree would not unduly inter-
fere with important governmental functions. The Court therefore
found no need for sovereign immunity. Had the Lee formulation re-
mained the test for immunity there would have been little confusion in
determining when a plaintiff can maintain a nonstatutory action
against the government. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court ignored
the reasoning in Lee when it decided Larson v. Domestic and Foreign
Commerce Corporation-9 in 1949.
In Larson the plaintiff had contracted with the War Assets Admin-
istrator to purchase coal. After a dispute arose over the method of pay-
ment, the Administrator contracted to sell the coal to a third party.
The plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the sale, claiming that title to the
coal had already passed to him. 60 The district court held that sovereign
immunity barred the suit.6 1 On appeal, the Supreme Court identified
the issue as whether a suit against an officer was, in effect, a suit against
the sovereign. "If it is, it must fail, whether or not the officer might
otherwise be suable. ' '62
53. Id. at 204.
54. Id. at 220.
55. Id. at 218-19.
56. Id. at 221-23. "The Circuit Court was competent to decide the issues in this case between
the parties that were before it." Id. at 223.
57. See notes 25-26 supra and accompanying text.
58. See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
59. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
60. Id. at 684.
61. Id. at 685.
62. Id. at 687.
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The Court in Larson then stated a test for deciding whether a suit
for specific relief is not a suit against the sovereign. Two categories of
suits would not be barred by sovereign immunity: those suits in which
a statute limited the officer's powers and the action complained of was
beyond those statutory powers (ultra vires), and those in which the stat-
ute or action was unconstitutional. 63 For cases in the first category,
general allegations of error in the exercise of authority would not be
sufficient; the plaintiff would have to allege the exact statutory limita-
tion on the officer's authority.
After formulating the test of ultra vires or unconstitutional action,
the Court placed a roadblock in the path of private litigants suing a
government official. Even if the suit were properly framed to fit into
one of the two categories, it might still fail "if the relief requested
[could] not be granted by merely ordering cessation of conduct com-
plained of but [would] require affirmative action by the sovereign
"64
Two 1963 Supreme Court cases, Dugan v. Rank 65 and Hawaii v.
Gordon,66 further refined the Larson case. Dugan involved a water di-
version program conducted by the Department of the Interior. The
plaintiff claimed that the Department had not legally obtained the
water rights in question and that the diversion of water was trespass
and was therefore beyond the scope of the officer's authority.67 The
plaintiff sought damages for water already diverted and an injunction
against further diversion. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of
the suit on sovereign immunity grounds, stating: "The general rule is
that a suit is against the sovereign if 'the judgment sought would ex-
pend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the pub-
lic administration .. . "68 According to the Larson-Dugan rationale,
a plaintiff not only would have to frame his pleadings to fit either the
ultra vires test or the unconstitutional test, but also would have to
frame his request for relief so that it would not infringe on the public
treasury or public administration.
In Hawaii v. Gordon the Court made ultra vires actions even more
difficult f6r the private litigant. The Court stated: "The general rule is
that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sov-
63. Id. at 689-90.
64. Id. at 691 n.ll.
65. 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
66. 373 U.S. 57 (1963).
67. 372 U.S. at 620.
68. Id. (quoting Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947)).
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ereign if the decree would operate against the latter.' ' 69 The difficulty
with this formulation is that any type of relief granted to a private
plaintiff in a suit against the government necessarily operates against
the government. 70 The anomaly thus presented was that a person could
bring a suit against a federal employee but the courts could not grant
any affirmative relief if the plaintiff prevailed.
The Larson line of cases fails to comport with the modem ration-
ale for sovereign immunity.71 Larson and its progeny preclude plain-
tiffs from suing the government, forcing them to frame suits as ultra
vires actions. Under the modem rationale the courts should determine
whether a plaintiff's action would be handled best by another branch of
government or whether the relief requested would constitute undue ju-
dicial interference. No sound reason exists for dismissing a plaintiff's
suit merely because the relief sought would operate against the govem-
ment.72
The confusion that resulted from the Larson line of cases left
lower courts frustrated. Judge McGowan of the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit noted that "[t]he doctrine itself is in a
considerable state of disrepair, at least in terms of intellectual respecta-
bility. . .. -73 Lower courts, recognizing the undue harshness of the
Larson test, used different methods to bypass the rule. In Littel v. Mor-
ton 74 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined the Larson
line of cases and determined that a mechanical application of that sov-
ereign immunity test would result in dismissal of the case. The court
refused, however, to apply the technicalities of the Larson-Dugan-
Gordon test. Instead, it distilled from those cases the policies underly-
ing the sovereign immunity doctrine and, using an undue-judicial-in-
terference test,75 found that the issue before it-contract
interpretation-was suitable for judicial review.76 According to the
court, "the underlying policies of the doctrine of sovereign immunity
are [not] so strong here as to require dismissal of this suit."77
Some lower courts also bypassed the Larson test by interpreting
69. 373 U.S. at 58.
70. This is true even when the court enjoins a government agency from continuing some type
of action. Perhaps the only time affirmative relief does not operate against the government is
when the court grants declaratory relief requiring no government action.
71. See notes 25-28 supra and accompanying text.
72. See text accompanying notes 17-23 supra.
73. Knox Hill Tenant Council v. Washington, 448 F.2d 1045, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
74. 445 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1971).
75. See text accompanying notes 27-31 supra.




footnote 11 in Larson78 to mean that sovereign immunity may, but
need not, bar relief if the relief sought would work affirmatively against
the sovereign.79 One court noted that the footnote said that a suit may
fail, but not that it must fail.80
Legal scholars have criticized the Larson test.8 ' Professor Davis
denounced the Larson maze of legal fictions:
When you sue the government for specific relief or for a declaratory
judgment, you must falsely pretend ... that the suit is not against
the government but that it is against an officer. You may get relief
against the sovereign if, but only if, you falsely pretend that you are
not asking for relief against the sovereign. The judges often will
falsely pretend that they are not giving you relief against the sover-
eign, even though you know and they know, and they know that you
know, that the relief is against the sovereign.82
Another scholar wrote that one of the chief problems with the sover-
eign immunity doctrine was that it transformed "everything into a play
on words."'83 By 1976 there was much dissatisfaction with the existing
law of sovereign immunity in nonstatutory review actions. The words
of Justice Cardozo seemed apt: "[W]hen a rule, after it has been duly
tested by experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the sense
of justice or . . .the social welfare, there should be less hesitation in
frank avowal and full abandonment."8 4
78. 337 U.S. at 691 n.ll. The Court stated:
[A] suit may fail, as one against the sovereign, even if it is claimed that the officer being
sued has acted unconstitutionally or beyond statutory powers, if the relief requested can
not be granted by merely ordering cessation of conduct complained of but will require
affirmative action by the sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably sovereign prop-
erty.
Id. (citing North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22 (1890)).
79. See Schlafiy v. Volpe, 495 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1974). The court noted that sovereign im-
munity bars suit when "[to do otherwise would impose 'an intolerable burden on governmental
functions, outweighing any consideration of private harm."' Id. at 280. See also Knox Hill Ten-
ant Council v. Washington, 448 F.2d 1045, 1051-52 (D.C. Cir. 1977); State Highway Comm'n v.
Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1123 (8th Cir. 1973); Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310, 1317-18 (9th Cir.
1969).
80. Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310, 1317-18 (9th Cir. 1969).
81. L. JAFFE, supra note 16, at 200; Byse, supra note 2, at 1485-88; Carrow, Sovereign Immu-
ni, in Administrative Law--A New Diagnosis, 9 J. PUB. L. 1 (1960); Cramton, supra note 3, at 404-
16; Davis, supra note 23, at 404-16; Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal
AdministrativeAction: Some Conclusionsfrom the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. RE. 867, 872-
82 (1970).
82. K. DAvIs, supra note 22, § 27.01, at 925.
83. Carrow, supra note 81, at 22 (letter to Carrow from Professor Walter Gellhorn).
84. B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 150 (1921), quoted in Carrow,
supra note 81, at 21-22.
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III. THE 1976 AMENDMENTS TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT
Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which is codified
in sections 701 through 706 of Title 5 of the United States Code, gives
individuals a right to judicial review of agency action. Section 10(a)
states: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of
a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.18 5 Although
section 10 provides a cause of action to a person harmed by federal
agency action, the section is not a jurisdictional grant.8 6 Rather, juris-
diction for such actions is based on jurisdictional statutes in the Judi-
cial Code.87 Most nonstatutory review actions88 fall within the
jurisdictional ambit of the federal question statute8 9 or the mandamus
statute.90
In 1976 section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act9' was
amended, as were the federal question 92 and venue provisions93 of the
Judicial Code. The purpose of the amendments was to "remove three
85. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
86. See notes 108-11 infra and accompanying text.
87. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330-1363 (1976).
88. See, ag., Legal Aid Soc'y v. Brennan, 608 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.
Ct. 3010 (1980); Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979);
Hill v. United States, 571 F.2d 1098 (9th Cir. 1978); Schlafly v. Volpe, 495 F.2d 273 (7th Cir.
1974); Knox Hill Tenant Council v. Washington, 448 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Littel v. Morton,
445 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1971).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
90. Id. § 1361.
91. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976). Section 702 as amended now reads:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof. An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other that Isict
money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted
orfailedto act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed
nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that the
United States is an indispensableparty. The United States may be named as a defendant in
any such action, and ajudgment or decree may be entered against the United States: Pro-
vided, That any mandatory or injunctive decree shall specfy the Federal offcer or officers
,(by name or title), and their successors in office, personally responsible for compliance.
Nothing herein (1) affects other limitations on judicial review or the power or duty of the
court to dismiss any action or deny relief on any other appropriate legal or equitable
grounds; or (2) confers authority to grant relief ff any other statute that grants consent to suit
expressly or impliedlyforbids the relief which is sought.
Id. § 702 (1976) (emphasis indicates portions added by the amendments, Act of Oct. 21, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 1, 90 Stat. 2721). Section 703 as amended now provides:
The form of proceeding for judicial review is the special statutory review proceeding
relevant to the subject matter in a court specified by statute or, in the absence or inade-
quacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action, including actions for declaratory
judgments or writs or prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus, in a court
of competent jurisdiction. If no special statutory reviewproceeding is applicable, the action
for judicial re view may be brought against the United States, the agency by its official title,
or the appropriate officer. Except to the extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportu-
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technical barriers to the consideration on the merits of citizens' com-
plaints against the Federal Government, its agencies or employees. '94
The amendments abolished sovereign immunity in nonstatutory suits
seeking relief other than money damages,95 allowed the United States
itself to be named as a party defendant, 96 allowed third party defend-
ants to be joined in such suits, 97 and eliminated the jurisdictional
amount requirement in suits against the United States and its officers. 98
It is important to note what these changes were intended to accom-
plish. Sovereign immunity was eliminated in suits for specific relief
only. "Thus the limitations on the recovery of money damages con-
tained in the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Tucker Act, or similar stat-
utes [were] unaffected." 99 Moreover, Congress eradicated sovereign
immunity only in cases involving those agencies and agency functions
defined in section 701(b)(1) of Title 5.100 Other agencies and agency
niyforjudicial review isprovided bylaw, agency action is subject to judicial review in civil
or criminal proceedingsfor judicial enforcement.
5 U.S.C. § 703 (1976) (emphasis indicates portions added by the amendments, Act of Oct. 21,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 1, 90 Stat. 2121).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). Section 1331(a) as amended provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exeeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs,
and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, except that no
such sum or value shall be required in any such action brought against the United States,
any agency thereof or any officer or employee thereof in his ofcial capacity.
Id. § 1331(a) (1976) (emphasis indicates portions added by the amendments, Act of Oct. 21, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 2, 90 Stat. 2721).
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1976). According to section 1391(e) as amended:
A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any
agency thereof acting in his official Capacity or under color of legal authority, or an
agency of the United States, or the United States, may, except as otherwise provided by
law, be brought in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the action resides, or
(2) the cause of action arose, or (3) any real property involved in the action is situated, or
(4) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action. Additional persons
may bejoined asparties to such action in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and with such other venue requirements as would be applicable fthe United States or
one of its officers, employees, or agencies were not a party.
Id. § 1391(e) (1976) (emphasis indicates portions added by the amendments, Act of Oct. 21, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 3, 90 Stat. 2721).
94. H.R. REP. No. 94-1656, supra note 8, at 3, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONrG. & AD.
NEWS 6123.
95. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
96. Id. § 703.
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976).
98. Id. § 1331(a).
99. H.R. REP. No. 94-1656, supra note 8, at 1I, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6131. The statute explicitly excludes actions for money damages, thus not exposing the
government to greater financial burden.
100. Id. 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(l) (1976) defines agency as:
[E]ach authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within
or subject to review by another agency, but does not include-
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actions are not within the purview of section 10 of the Administrative
Procedure Act and judicial review of the actions of those agencies is
possible only if Congress has specifically provided for such review by
statute.101 The 1976 amendments also left open the question of juris-
diction. There is no indication in the language of the amendments that
section 10 is now to be construed as a grant of jurisdiction.10 2
The amendments were not intended to change existing law per-
taining to other types of judicial review. This is explicitly set out in the
provision: "Nothing herein. . . affects other limitations on judicial re-
view or the power or duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny
relief on any other appropriate legal or equitable ground."' 0 3 Thus,
though sovereign immunity is partially eliminated, other bars to suit
remain intact. The House Report on the amendments notes seven dis-
tinct grounds that would still require dismissal of a suit against the gov-
ernment:
(1) extraordinary relief should not be granted because of the hard-
ship to the defendant or to the public ("balancing the equities") or
because the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law; (2) action com-
mitted to agency discretion; (3) express or implied preclusion of judi-
cial review; (4) standing; (5) ripeness; (6) failure to exhaust
administrative remedies; and (7) an exclusive alternative remedy. 104
The legislative history of the 1976 amendments shows that Con-
gress's main intent was to eliminate the confusion reflected in the case
law concerning the sovereign immunity doctrine. 05 The Judiciary
(A) the Congress;(B) the courts of the United States;
(C) the governments of the territories or possessions of the United States;
(D) the government of the District of Columbia;
(E) agencies composed of representatives of the parties or of representatives of
organizations of the parties to the disputes determined by them;
(F) courts martial and military commissions;
(G) military authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory;
or
(H) functions conferred by sections 1738, 1739, 1743, and 1744 of title 12; chapter
2 of title 41; or sections 1622, 1844, 1891-1902, and former section 1641(b)(2), of title
50 . ..
101. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2207 (1976) (providing for review of Department of Defense con-
tracts); 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1976) (providing for review of Federal Trade Commission findings of
unfair methods of competition); 15 U.S.C. § 77vvv (1976) (providing for review of Security and
Exchange Commission orders under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939); 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-O), (1)
(1976) (providing for review of the National Labor Relations Board's findings of unfair labor
practices); 45 U.S.C. § 431(0 (1976) (providing for review of the Secretary of Transportation's
safety rules for railroads).
102. See notes 108-11 infra and accompanying text.
103. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
104. H.R. REP. No. 94-1656, supra note 8, at 12, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6132.
105. For a discussion of the confusion created by the Supreme Court's decisions, see text ac-
companying notes 49-84 supra.
SO VEREIGN IMMUNITY
Committee of the House of Representatives, in recommending the leg-
islation, recognized that the proper test for determining when courts
should not entertain a suit against the government is whether there
would be undue judicial interference with administrative action: "The
committee does not believe that the partial elimination of sovereign
immunity, as a barrier to nonstatutory review of Federal administrative
action will create undue interference with administrative action.
Rather, it will be a safety-value to ensure greater fairness and account-
ability in the administrative machinery of the Government." 10 6
The legislative history thus indicates that Congress believed undue
judicial interference to be an appropriate modem rationale for sover-
eign immunity. A plaintiff's suit should be blocked by immunity only
when judicial review would constitute undue interference or violate the
separation-of-powers doctrine. Nonetheless, courts have not always in-
terpreted and applied the amendments in this manner.10 7
IV. INTERPRETATION OF THE 1976 AMENDMENTS BY
FEDERAL COURTS
Shortly after the enactment of the 1976 amendments to the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, the Supreme Court decided that section 10
does not grant jurisdiction in addition to providing plaintiffs with a
cause of action for review of agency action. The Court's holding in
Calfano v. Sanders 0 settled a conffict among the courts of appeals. 10 9
The Court ruled that the federal question statute, 110 and not section 10,
was the proper jurisdictional predicate for nonstatutory review ac-
tions. ''
The courts of appeals have not, however, agreed upon the extent to
which the amendments actually abolish sovereign immunity in nonstat-
utory review actions. In Estate of Watson v. Blumenthal"2 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit interpreted the 1976 amendments nar-
rowly and found that a plaintiff's suit could still be blocked under the
Larson line of cases.' 13 The plaintiff in Watson sought declaratory re-
106. H.R. REP. No. 94-1656, supra note 8, at 9, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6129-30.
107. See text accompanying notes 112-25 infra.
108. 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977).
109. Compare Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974), and
Bradley v. Weinberger, 483 F.2d 410 (Ist Cir. 1973), with Bramblett v. Desobry, 490 F.2d 405 (6th
Cir. 1974), and Zimmerman v. United States, 422 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1970).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
111. 430 U.S. at 105.
112. 586 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1978).
113. Id. at 929-32. See text accompanying notes 59-70 supra.
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lief and an order to compel the government to redeem certain United
States Treasury Bonds at par value for payment of federal estate
taxes."t 4 The plaintiffs asserted jurisdiction under sections 1331 (fed-
eral questions), 1361 (mandamus), 1391(e) (venue for suits against of-
ficers), and 2201(e) (declaratory judgment) of Title 28.'15 The actual
holding by the court of appeals in Watson was that the district court
lacked jurisdiction because the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdic-
tion under the Tucker Act.1 16 The court of appeals was not satisfied,
however, with such a simplistic disposition of the case and decided to
address the broader question of sovereign immunity and the 1976
Amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act.1 7 The court began
its analysis of the 1976 amendments by finding that nonstatutory re-
view actions under section 1331 were distinct from actions brought
under the Administrative Procedure Act."18 According to the court, the
amendments partially waived sovereign immunity under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act but not under section 1331.119 Furthermore,
there was no subject matter jurisdiction under section 10 of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act:120 "[T]he amendments. . . do not provide for
114. Watson, a former United States Ambassador, became comatose after an accident. His
brother, as attorney-in-fact, purchased Treasury bonds, known as Flower bonds, while Watson
was comatose. These bonds could be used upon the owner's death to pay federal estate taxes. In
this case, since the bonds were purchased while Watson was comatose, the Bureau of Public Debt
refused the tender of the bonds upon Watson's death, claiming the purchase was beyond the
brother's authority under a general power of attorney. Upon the Bureau's refusal, the estate sued
the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of the Bureau of Public Debt. Id. at 927-28.
115. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1361, 1391(e), 2201(e) (1976). The court of appeals limited its consid-
eration of jurisdiction to the federal question and mandamus statutes. The court found that 28
U.S.C. §§ 1391(e) and 2201 were inapplicable. 586 F.2d at 928. Section 1391(e) is a venue statute
and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976), "does not provide an independent
basis for jurisdiction but simply increases the remedies available to a litigant. . . ." 586 F.2d at
928.
116. 586 F.2d at 929. The Tucker Act provides in pertinent part:
The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim
against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress,
or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract
with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding
in tort.
28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976).
117. 586 F.2d at 929. The court said "this analysis may be simplistic if it involves simply an
attempt to pigeonhole the case under one label. . . or another. . . in the hope that the pigeonhol-
ing itself will solve the problem .... A more sophisticated analysis must also take into account
the matter of sovereign immunity."
118. Id. at 932. The court's rationale for this interesting conclusion was that different sections
of the amendments' legislative history discussed the Administrative Procedure Act and section
1331. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. In finding no subject matter jurisdiction under section 10 of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976), the court followed the holding in Califano v. Sanders, 430
U.S. 99 (1977). See notes 109-11 supra and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction but only make it clear that sovereign immunity will not be
a defense in actions in which jurisdiction does exist .... ,,121 Under
the court's interpretation of the section 10 amendments, therefore, sov-
ereign immunity can still bar a plaintiff's suit by precluding a court
from exercising jurisdiction under the relevant jurisdictional statute.
Next, after examining the plaintiff's claim, the court held that it
had no jurisdiction under section 1331. According to the court, Larson,
Dugan, and Gordon were controlling; therefore a suit against the gov-
ernment could not be permitted if the remedy sought would act against
the public treasury.' 22 Quoting an unreported district court case, Estate
of Pingree v. Blumenthal,123 the court found that an order compelling
government redemption of the bonds would operate against the gov-
ernment and diminish the public treasury.' 24 The plaintiffs were there-
fore precluded from receiving nonstatutory review of their claim.
Finding no express statutory waiver that would otherwise permit the
plaintiffs to proceed, the court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdic-
tion.125
The Watson analysis is unsatisfactory because it ignores the logic
of Caiffano v. Sanders 26 and nullifies the effect of the amendments to
section 10. Under the Sanders rationale, although section 10 of the
Administrative Procedure Act is not itself a grant of jurisdiction, a non-
statutory review action can be brought under section 1331.127 The
cause of action would be based on the amended section 702 (section
10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act) 28 which eliminates sover-
eign immunity as a defense. Watson, however, denies any connection
between the two provisions. If a case is brought using section 1331 as a
jurisdictional predicate, Watson insists that Larson applies, regardless
of whether the action is framed in terms of a section 10 cause of action.
121. 586 F.2d at 932. The remainder of the court's opinion focuses on the relationship be-
tween the Tucker Act and the Administrative Procedure Act as amended. The court found that
the Tucker Act applied to the case and that Congress intended it to be an exclusive remedy. Id. at
933. The amended section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act explicitly states that a court
cannot grant relief under section 702 of the Act if another statute expressly or impliedly forbids
the relief Section 702 is set out in full at note 91 supra. This part of the court's interpretation is
sound. Congress did not intend to eliminate sovereign immunity under section 702 where mone-
tary relief is sought and exclusive jurisdiction is granted under another statute. See notes 99-100
supra and accompanying text.
122. See 586 F.2d at 929-31.
123. No. Civ-77-3-ND (D. Me. Mar. 3, 1978).
124. 586 F.2d at 930.
125. 586 F.2d at 935.
126. 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
127. See text accompanying notes 108-11 supra.
128. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
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This analysis renders superfluous congressional efforts to make it easier
to bring nonstatutory review actions.
The Watson analysis is also inconsistent with the modem rationale
for sovereign immunity. Under Watson a plaintiff's contract or bond
redemption action is barred even though the courts are quite capable of
deciding those questions. The modem rationale for immunity, how-
ever, indicates that courts should permit such actions. An order com-
pelling redemption of the treasury bonds in Watson would not have
interfered with the administration of a government program since the
program in question was expressly designed to redeem bonds for estate
tax purposes. 129
District courts within the Second Circuit have followed the court
of appeals' opinion in Wa/son.130 Courts of appeals in other circuits,
however, have not fallen in line. The interpretations of the 1976
amendments by the Courts of Appeals for the Third and Ninth Circuits
have been consistent with the plain congressional intent behind those
amendments.' 3 ' The leading case is Jaffee v. United States,132 which, in
part, involved a class action suit against the United States arising out of
the Army's testing of an atomic bomb. 33 Jaffee sought two types of
relief on behalf of a class composed of all Army personnel who were
present during the test explosion. Jaffee sought to warn all class mem-
bers of the potential medical risks facing them and to force the govern-
ment to pay for or subsidize medical care for class members.' 34 The
district court dismissed the class action count because of sovereign im-
munity.
The court of appeals concluded that because the Federal Tort
Claims Act' 35 did not cover the suit, Jaffee could bring his suit only if
129. See 31 U.S.C. § 752 (1976). It must be noted, however, that there may be a jurisdictional
conflict between the district court and the Court of Claims. See notes 116 & 121 supra.
130. See Sharrock v. Harris, 473 F. Supp. 1173 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Sterling Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. v. Teltronics Servs., Inc., 471 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
131. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1656, supra note 8, at 3, 6, 9, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 6123, 6126, 6129.
132. 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1979).
133. Jaffee was serving in the Army in 1953 at Camp Desert Rock, Nevada, when the Army
tested a nuclear device. Jaffee alleged that he and others were ordered to stand in a field near the
site of the explosion without protection from radiation. Jaffee and others were exposed to massive
doses of radiation. Jaffee alleged that this exposure caused him to develop inoperable cancer.
Jaffee and his wife brought a four-count suit against the United States. Three counts were claims
for money damages; the fourth count was brought in the form of a class action. 592 F.2d at 714.
134. The district court retained jurisdiction over the first three counts of the Jaffees' complaint.
Id.
135. The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976), does not provide a
cause of action for injuries to servicemen arising out of activity incident to service. See Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
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Congress had waived the government's immunity by some other stat-
ute.' 36 The court found that Congress intended that section 702,
"under some circumstances, would waive sovereign immunity."'1 37 Ex-
plicitly disagreeing with the Watson decision, the court held that "sec-
tion 702, when it applies, waives sovereign immunity in 'nonstatutory'
review of agency action under section 1331. '13 8
Before both Jaffee and Watson, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit decided Hill v. United States.139 The plaintiff in Hill
sought a writ of mandamus, declaratory relief, and damages for the
refusal of the Army and the Civil Service Commission to convert him
to career-conditional status during temporary civilian employment in
the Army. He asserted jurisdiction under sections 1331 and 1361. The
district court had dismissed the case on sovereign immunity grounds.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the 1976 amend-
ments operated retroactively to lift the bar of sovereign immunity for
those parts of the claim seeking declaratory relief and a writ of manda-
mus."4° Addressing the effect of the amendments on sovereign immu-
nity, the court concluded: "This statute is cast as a blanket waiver of
sovereign immunity as to a broad category of actions against the gov-
ernment, and by its terms it certainly includes the non-monetary relief
sought by Hill."141
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in LegalAid Society v.
Brennan, 42 recently reaffirmed its decision that the 1976 amendments
have abolished sovereign immunity in nonstatutory review actions
based on section 1331. A number of recent district court cases have
also followed the Jaffee-Hill reasoning. 143 Unlike Watson, Jaffee and
136. 592 F.2d at 716, 718.
137. Id.
138. Id. The court then addressed whether the specific relief applied for came under section
702. It held that the request for subsidies for medical costs was a money damages claim; section
702 thus did not apply and sovereign immunity barred the claim. The section of the complaint
asking for a warning to class members, however, was within section 702 as a form of equitable
relief. Moreover, the Army came within section 701(b)(l)'s definition of "agency," making its
actions reviewable under section 702. See note 100 supra. The definition of agency under section
701(b)(1) excludes the military only if the action arises "in the field or at time of war." The
plaintiff in Jaffee sought relief for the government's failure to act in the years following the nu-
clear testing, thus the section 701(b)(1) exclusion did not apply. 592 F.2d at 720.
139. 571 F.2d 1098 (9th Cir. 1978).
140. Id. at 1102.
141. Id. The court held, however, that the suit would still be defeated because there was no
substantive right on which to base relief. The court relied on United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392
(1976).
142. 608 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 3010 (1980).
143. Collyard v. Washington Capitals, 477 F. Supp. 1247 (D. Minn. 1979); Neal v. Secretary
of Navy, 472 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Saltzman v. Stetson, 472 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
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Hill effectuate the congressional intent to abolish sovereign immunity
unless there is good reason for the doctrine to bar a suit.144 Jaffee and
Hill thus comport with the modem rationale for sovereign immu-
nity.145 The Supreme Court, however, has yet to resolve the dispute
between the courts of appeals.
V. FURTHER ACTION TO INSURE COMPLIANCE WITH
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
Given the split among the courts of appeals concerning the proper
interpretation of the 1976 amendments, the status of the sovereign im-
munity doctrine remains uncertain. Congress's purpose in passing the
amendments was to make it easier to sue the government for non-mon-
etary, specific relief.'46 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's
interpretation in Watson frustrates this purpose by reinstituting the
fiction of the ultra vires action against government officers and by forc-
ing plaintiffs to frame their requests for relief so as not to operate
against the government.
This section of the comment suggests several ways for the courts
and Congress to effectuate the congressional purposes behind the
amendments and to alleviate the problems that continue to surround
the sovereign immunity doctrine.
A. Supreme Court Review.
The best approach to accomplishing the goals of the 1976 amend-
ments would be for the Supreme Court to resolve the conflict among
the circuits that Watson and Jaffee created. A case such as Sharrock v.
Harris,147 for example, which follows the Watson approach, would
provide the Court with an opportunity to resolve the conflict by explic-
itly repudiating Watson and adopting the sounder rationale of the Jaf-
fee court. The plaintiff in Sharrock was a tenant in a federally assisted
housing project. He claimed that his lease failed to contain certain pro-
visions mandated by the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development. The plaintiff asserted jurisdic-
tion based on section 1331 and framed the suit as a nonstatutory review
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently reaffirmed its decision in Jaffee in National
Sea Clammers Assoc. v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1980).
144. See notes 105-06 supra and accompanying text.
145. See text accompanying notes 24-36 supra.
146. See note 121 supra.
147. 473 F. Supp. 1173 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See also Doe v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n,
483 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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action under section 702. Rejecting the plaintiff's jurisdictional argu-
ment based on Jaffee, the district court dismissed the case on sovereign
immunity grounds, relying on Watson. 148 Accepting a case such as
Sharrock from the court of appeals would give the Supreme Court a
chance to review both Jaffee and Watson and, by rejecting the Second
Circuit's view, an opportunity to reach the proper result.
Alternatively, the Court could overrule its holding in Califano v.
Sanders 149 that section 702 is not an independent grant of jurisdiction.
This would side-step the Jaffee- Watson problem because jurisdiction
could then be based on a statute containing an explicit waiver of sover-
eign immunity. It is highly unlikely, however, that the Supreme Court
would overrule Caifano v. Sanders; the case is fairly recent and the
Court squarely decided the question of the proper jurisdictional predi-
cate for a nonstatutory review action.150
Ultimately, the Supreme Court could aid in effectuating the con-
gressional purpose behind the 1976 amendments by adopting the un-
due-judicial-interference and separation-of-powers tests.' 5a The Court
could outline a list of considerations for lower courts to balance when
deciding whether Congress intended to waive sovereign immunity in a
specific suit. The considerations favoring a finding of congressional
waiver would be the nature of the harm the plaintiff alleges,' 52 the type
of relief he seeks, and whether the case presents a question that courts
are especially qualified to answer. Considerations indicating that Con-
gress did not intend to waive sovereign immunity would include the
degree of interference that compliance with the requested court order
would have on a government program and whether the action com-
plained of is of the type the agency in question can handle more readily
than the courts could.
Optimally, the Supreme Court would both reject the Watson deci-
sion and explicitly adopt the undue-judicial-interference test. Reject-
ing Watson would indicate that nonstatutory review actions under
section 702 are properly based on jurisdiction conferred by the federal
question statute.' 53 Adopting the undue-judicial-interference test
148. 473 F. Supp. at 1176: "ITihis court believes that the Second Circuit's clear pronounce-
ment cannot be ignored."
149. See notes 108-11 supra and accompanying text.
150. See text accompanying note 111 supra.
15 1. Congress relied upon these tests in enacting the amendments. See notes 105-06 supra and
accompanying text.
152. The more egregious the government action, the stronger the presumption of congres-
sional waiver. In a case like Jaffee, in which the government failed to warn the servicemen of a
grave danger, there would be a strong presumption in favor of a waiver of sovereign immunity.
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
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would give judges discretion within certain guidelines to determine
whether section 702 provides a particular cause of action.154
B. Further Congressional Action.
Congressional action to further effectuate the purposes of the orig-
inal 1976 amendments would parallel the suggestions made above in
regard to Supreme Court review. Congress could amend section 702
again to make it a grant of jurisdiction for district court review of
agency action. This would be a statutory overruling of Caiffano v.
Sanders. The legislation could make it clear that section 702 would
provide the basis for all nonstatutory review of administrative action.
Sovereign immunity would still be eliminated in suits for non-mone-
tary specific relief, but other barriers to suit-such as the existence of
an adequate remedy at law, standing, or failure to exhaust administra-
tive remedies' 55-would remain intact.
This appears to be the most logical solution to the problem. Cases
such as Jaffee were decided on the basis of statutory interpretation; an
explicit statutory grant of jurisdiction would be dispositive to even the
most literal-minded judges. The courts would then be able to focus on
problems of judicial review of administrative actions and not on the
technical problems of jurisdiction.
Alternatively, Congress could amend Section 1331 to eliminate
sovereign immunity under that statute. This is a more drastic solution
than amending section 702; it would probably result in a plethora of
suits that Congress still intends to bar through sovereign immunity.
These types of suits would include actions for money damages, contract
actions,15 6 and actions against agencies otherwise exempt from judicial
review.157 The first two types of actions are relegated to the jurisdiction
of the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act;158 the last type of suit is
barred because of the nature of the agency involved and because pri-
vate suits would result in undue judicial interference with those agen-
cies, thus violating the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
An amended section 1331 would have to contain highly technical pro-
visions making it clear that sovereign immunity would continue to bar
those types of actions.
154. See notes 99-104 supra and accompanying text. See also notes 149-50 supra and accom-
panying text.
155. See notes 103-04 supra and accompanying text.
156. The Tucker Act is the exclusive grant of jurisdiction for suits based on government con-
tracts. See notes 41 & 99 supra and accompanying text.
157. See note lOOsupra for the definition of agency under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 701(b)(1) (1976).
158. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976).
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One final suggestion is for Congress to add a jurisdictional statute
to the Judicial Code. This statute would grant jurisdiction to the dis-
trict courts to hear all suits against the government or its employees
that allege agency impropriety or illegal agency action and that seek
non-monetary specific relief. This new statute would be the basis for
all nonstatutory review actions. Explicit language in such a statute
would eliminate many of the problems discussed above with regard to
amending section 1331.
It is highly unlikely, however, that Congress will take any action in
the near future. Congress took almost ten years to act on the original
suggestion to amend the Administrative Procedure Act.15 9 Further
amendment of the Act might take as long. The Supreme Court should
therefore take the initial steps to resolve the problems this comment
examines. Such action is necessary to ensure rational application of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.
VI. CONCLUSION
Sovereign immunity as a bar to suits against the United States
government has persisted for almost one hundred and fifty years.1 60
The courts have devised ways to circumvent the doctrine by creating
the legal fiction of ultra vires suits against government officers. In its
earliest form a court would have jurisdiction over an ultra vires action
if the court were competent to decide the issues in the case.16' The
Supreme Court later changed this. In a series of cases beginning with
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp. 162 the Court held that
an ultra vires action could not be maintained if the affirmative relief
sought by a plaintiff would "operate" against the sovereign.' 63 Courts
and commentators, however, have found little justification for the con-
tinued application of the Larson rationale in many cases.
The modem rationale for sovereign immunity suggests that the
doctrine should preclude a plaintiff's suit only when judicial review
would violate the separation-of-powers requirement or constitute un-
159. Administrative Procedure Act Amendments of 1976: Hearings on S.800 Before the Sub-
comm. on Administrative Practice andProcedure of the Senate Comnm on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 186 (1976) (statement of the Federal Bar Association). The original impetus for the 1976
amendments was a 1968 recommendation by the Administrative Conference Committee on Judi-
cial Review. The full Administrative Conference adopted the recommendation in 1969. 38
U.S.L.W. 2242 (1969). The Senate began hearings on a proposed bill in 1970, but the Department
of Justice opposed the bill and it was defeated. Hearings on S.800, supra, at 186.
160. See United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286 (1846).
161. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882). See notes 50-57 supra and accompanying text.
162. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
163. See notes 59-70 supra and accompanying text.
Vol. 1981:I116]
DUKE LAW JO UMAL
due judicial interference with the official actions of the government.
Congress followed the modem rationale for the doctrine in amending
the Administrative Procedure Act,, thereby eliminating sovereign im-
munity in most suits against the government brought under the Act.
The courts, however, have struggled with the congressional
amendments and disagree about their effect. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in Estate of Watson v. Blumentha 164 virtually inter-
preted the amendments out of existence and reinstituted the Larson
rationale. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Jaffee v.
United States,165 correctly interpreted the amendments to allow a pri-
vate citizen to bring suit against the government if such a suit does not
constitute undue judicial interference with any agency program. The
controversy continues as district courts are faced with suits against the
government. 166
Congress's intent in amending section 10 of the Administrative
Procedure Act is clear: sovereign immunity is eliminated as a bar to
suit against an agency when such a suit will not unduly interfere with a
government program. Further action by either the Supreme Court or
Congress is needed, however, to insure that sovereign immunity is in-
voked according to the modem rationale for its existence.
Sharon J Kronish
164. 586 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1978).
165. 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979).
166. See notes 143 & 147 supra.
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